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BOOKS RECEIVED

Lawyers and the American Dream. By Stuart M. Speiser. New
York: M. Evans and Company, Inc. 1993. Pp. 423. Paperback.
$16.95.
Lawyers and the American Dream explores the American
dream and the role of lawyers who represent underdogs in making
that dream a reality. Ralph Nader applauds the book for its examination of the way lawyers for the "wrongfully harmed have nourished the American common law to hold powerful perpetrators of
injury accountable for their recklessness." Speiser recounts the development of "the Equalizers," or lawyers who represent underdogs in
civil lawsuits, through stories of landmark cases, many of which he
participated in himself. He makes this book accessible to the nonlawyer by beginning with a lexicon of legal terms and a simplified
description of negligence, intentional torts, and product liability. He
also captures the popular imagination with his analysis of the television show L.A. Law as a metaphor for the American dream and as a
distorted vision of reality.
In Chapter One, Speiser examines the American dream. He begins aptly by stating that the American Dream eludes definition; it is
like trying to catch a moonbeam in a jar. He explores the dream in
movies and television and concludes that every episode of L.A. Law
contains a healthy selection from the Dream smorgasbord: material
success, love, self-made excellence, empowerment of the weak and
the underdog, melting pot, happy ending, and sometimes, even justice. In Chapter Two, Speiser discusses the firm of McKenzie Brackman in L.A. Law. Although L.A. Law appears to embody some of
the elements of the American Dream, Speiser concludes that the underdog, self-reliant, and entrepreneurial aspects are missing. According to Speiser, L.A. Law has presented a distorted role of the tort
specialist as an obnoxious ambulance chaser when the tort lawyer is
the real hero of the American dream.
Chapter Three leaves the make-believe office of McKenzie
Brackman and examines equalizers such as the civil rights lawyer
and Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, criminal lawyers
who help underdogs, lawyers who represent shareholders and bond-
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holders in suits against financial manipulators, and pro bono lawyers. The focus of this chapter, however, and of the book, is on the
tort lawyer. Speiser states that tort lawyers simply have no choice; if
they want to do well, they must help the underdog at the same time.
In Chapters Three through Nine, the author describes the
emergence of the Equalizers during the 1950's by focusing on Jane
Froman v. Pan American Airways, a case which arose out of the
crash of the Pan Am flying boat Yankee Clipper. His discussion of
the strategy and tactics of the plaintiff's lawyers and his excerpts
from the trial bring the case to life. The reader can feel Speiser's
frustration and shame at the failure of "the Equalizers" to vindicate
the rights of the underdog. Plaintiff Froman only received $9,050, an
amount that represented less than three percent of her medical bills.
In Chapter Ten the author assesses the weaknesses of plaintiff's
lawyers through the early twentieth century. He states that American tort practice began in the second half of the nineteenth century, a
time which coincided with the high point of laissez-faire, little concern for social justice, and the credo of "survival of the fittest." He
argues that, in the name of free enterprise, railroads and industry
were permitted to deal brutally with injury claimants. However,
Speiser credits two evolutionary changes with helping plaintiffs. One
is that airliners are now equipped with flight recorders ("black
boxes" and cockpit voice records. In addition, most jurors have some
experience as airline passengers; airlines no longer command the status of demigods they did in the 1940's and 1950's. However, Speiser
also credits the development of tort lawyers as equalizers because
they began to make use of broad discovery and convince the courts to
follow the established definitions of wilful misconduct in Warsaw
Convention cases. In Jane Froman v. Pan American Airways, the
Judge instructed the jury that the pilot had to intend the result (i.e.
the crash) as well as the act. The definition of wilful misconduct
became flexible enough to support a jury verdict against Korean Air
Lines in the trial arising out of the shooting down of its Flight 007
by a Soviet fighter plane which occurred over the Sea of Japan in
1983. Speiser feels confident that today Pan Am would feel fortunate
to settle the case for $10 million dollars. In this chapter, Speiser also
examines Nader v. General Motors, a case that furnished a winning
model for David-Goliath confrontations between individuals and corporate giants like GM. In this case Nader sued GM for invasion of
privacy after he was followed by investigators and spied on by GM.
Nader used the $425,000 settlement proceeds to launch the consumer
movement.
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In Chapter Eleven Speiser describes cases where he represented
plaintiffs against the tycoons Aristotle Onassis and Aldo Gucci.
Chapter Twelve focuses on Melvin M. Belli, a tort lawyer in
San Francisco, a man who Speiser extols for his struggle on behalf of
millions of underdogs. He chronicles the development of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, an organization with more than
60,000 lawyers and 75 litigation groups, each one dedicated to a particular field of litigation such as Asbestos in Schools, Breast Implants, Dalkon Shield IUD devices, Formaldehyde, Nursing Homes,
Tire/Rim Mismatches, and Yugo Automobiles. Speiser argues that
ATLA has become a great Equalizer and serves as the command
post in the continuing battle to achieve justice for the underdog. In
this chapter Speiser also discusses the development of strict liability
for defective products through case law. He states that Prosser's restatement gave plaintiff's lawyers strong scholarly authority for
spreading strict product liability to states that still cling to the "privity" rule, the rule that prohibited suit for negligence or strict liability
by those who had not bought the defective product directly from the
manufacturer. Without "the Equalizers," Speiser states that privity
would still bar the door to real consumer protection and that your
children's children would be forced to inhale asbestos in their school
rooms because there would never have been enough pressure from
government agencies to force removal of asbestos or withdrawal of
thousands of other dangerous products.
Chapter Thirteen explores wrongful death cases and what
Speiser perceives as the cheapening of human life beginning in the
nineteenth century. Speiser's book Recovery for Wrongful Death,
published in 1965, was instrumental in making wrongful death
awards more equitable. The theme of his book was that use of economic data and the testimony of economists as expert witnesses were
commonplace in commercial litigation and should be used in wrongful death cases. Today it is common for plaintiff's lawyers to use
economists as appraisers in death cases, and also in personal injury
cases involving loss of future earnings. The book was cited by the
Supreme Court of Texas and the Oregon Supreme Court and Prosser called it an excellent text.
Chapter Fourteen explores the case of the shooting down of
KAL 007, a Korean civilian airliners, by the Soviets and of the deterrent effect of punitive damages. In this chapter, Speiser also discusses the importance of the contingent fee and its application in an
industry with performance-based pay, that is, pay that is gauged to
the quality of performance. He assails American manufacturers for
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failing to emphasize quality. He cites a 1985 survey of institutional
investors who listed the quality of a company's products last as a
factor in stock selection. He argues that "the Equalizers" play an
important role in the free-market approach to defective products.
In the final chapters of the book, Speiser advocates the development of Equalizers in other nations, because democratic market-oriented societies require empowerment of the individual and equal access to justice. He argues that eventually the empowerment of the
underdog through the American Equalizers, as seen on television
and films, will create a demand for similar access to justice throughout the world.
Stuart M. Speiser has written a passionate book in support of
the tort lawyer as champion of the underdog. He presents a kaleidoscopic picture of some of the landmark cases of the century from the
point of view of a partisan who experienced the agony of defeat and
the exhilaration of victory. Speiser's past legal writings have been
influential in sweeping away nineteenth-century barriers to equal
justice. Lawyers and the American Dream presents a vision of the
American tort system as an inspiration for justice-seekers everywhere
in the world.

Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law & Gender. By Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy. Boulder: Westview Press.
1991. Pp. 446. Hardcover. $66.00. Paperback. $18.95.
Feminist legal theory offers an analysis of the relationship between law and gender. This theory is important because it challenges
fundamental assumptions of traditional legal doctrine and method.
Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender presents some
of the most thought-provoking and diverse scholarship in this field.
The book is aimed at students of the law, at anyone interested in
women's issues, at legal scholars, and at newcomers to the field. As
an introduction for nonlawyers, the authors provide an overview of
the relationship between law and feminism and outline some of the
ways in which law limits, as well as assists, political and social
reform.
Part One of the book explores sexual difference and equality
theory; part two questions the fundamental assumptions of legal doctrines. Part three of the book examines feminism and critical theory,
and part four focuses on feminist self-criticism.
In the introduction, the editors discuss the ways law limits political and social reform. One constraint they identify is the law's

19931

BOOKS RECEIVED

insistence on precedent. Feminists often find that precedent reinforces a status quo that is more favorable to male interests. They
find that arguments that deviate significantly from precedent are
often considered extreme and less likely to be successful. The editors
claim that law's respect for precedent often creates a tension between
the immediate interests of clients and the broader interests of women
generally. They give the example of the "battered woman's syndrome." Although evidence of the "battered woman's syndrome" to
prove self-defense in a homicide case may educate the public about
domestic violence, in many jurisdictions such a defense will have little chance of success and may contradict the safer "diminished-capacity" defense that the client may be able to establish. In addition,
the editors argue that feminists find law constraining because it insists upon arguments that are rational and coherent rather than ambiguous or contradictory. They point out that standards of what is
rational often reflect the interests of those who currently hold power.
They argue that an insistence on "rational" explanations can hurt
women because women are sometimes forced to articulate claims and
explanations in court that appear contradictory. For example,
women in predominantly female occupations seeking to establish
claims for comparable worth must reconcile the argument that they
are underpaid with the admission that they have freely chosen these
jobs. The editors also point out that courts prefer clear dichotomous
legal categories to overlapping ones; therefore, a black woman claiming discrimination because of the combination of her race and sex
may be unable to fit her claim into the law's narrow requirements of
either race or sex discrimination. Despite the difficulties of seeking
change through law, the editors state that feminist legal scholars recognize that law is power. They indicate that there is a tension between feminists who argue that legal theory can produce meaningful
legal change and those who are skeptical of theory and believe that
women's lives can only be achieved by using law pragmatically as a
tool for reform.
Part One focuses on sexual difference and equality theory and
includes Wendy Williams' article, "The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism." In this article, Williams explores the stereotypes of masculinity and femininity embedded in rules and statutes. She focuses on the male-only draft,
statutory rape laws, and pregnancy and argues that women must
recognize that choosing to emphasize differences provides the basis
for treating women worse as well as better than men.
Williams has been criticized by feminists who argue that an
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equal treatment approach benefits women who meet male norms but
not women in traditional female activities. Christine Littleton in
"Reconstructing Sexual Equality" suggests as a feminist goal that all
sexual differences be made "costless." She proposes that the cost for
engaging in a female identified activity or trait shall be no higher
than engaging in a "male" identified activity or trait. For example, a
mother should receive honor, compensation, and reentry job preferences comparable to a military veteran.
Part One also includes essays by feminists who have opposed
mainstream feminist theory. In "Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics," Kimberle Crenshaw argues that antidiscrimination law constitutes a "top-down"
structure whereby victims of discrimimation must establish their
claims according to categories that fail to recognize the relationship
between race and sex. Crenshaw criticizes feminist theory because it
has ignored the intersection of race and sex by basing its analysis on
the experiences of white women.
Catharine MacKinnon also rejects the equality versus difference
debate. In "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,"
MacKinnon argues that equality doctrine is flawed because it permits differences between women and men to legitimate unequal and
abusive conditions for women. She argues that feminists should concentrate on identifying dominance, the ways in which male domination and female subordination have been created and perpetuated,
rather than differences between men and women.
In "Deconstructing Gender," Joan Williams rejects the terms of
the equality debate. She argues that gender should not be ignored
nor misrepresented but "deinstitutionalized." Finally, Vicki Schultz's
article, "Telling Stories About Women and Work," rejects the conventional explanations for sex segregation in the workplace and develops an alternative explanation based on organizational structures
and cultures in the workplace. She argues that the legal system has
perpetuated the status quo of sex segregation by refusing to acknowledge its own power to dismantle it.
The articles in Part Two critique the Anglo-American legal
system. In "On Being the Object of Property," Patricia Williams
attacks the laws assumptions about subjectivity. In the essay, Williams explores her own roots in a search for her total identity and
critiques the role played by the law in fragmenting and "partializing" identity. In "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence," Catharine MacKinnon argues that

1993]

BOOKS RECEIVED

female attributes and values are social constructs. She contends that
female sexuality, the key component of gender identity, is constructed for men's benefit through the process of objectification and
that the male viewpoint is considered the neutral and objective one.
She analyzes the law of rape as illustrative of the way the focus is on
the male rather than the female subject, and she argues that the definition of "normal" protects male interests.
In "Jurisprudence and Gender" Robin West contends that
modern legal theory is male because it assumes that individuals are
essentially separate from one another. West contends that women are
connected to other human beings through such activities as
breasifeeding and pregnancy. She urges a feminist jurisprudence that
criticizes the failure of male jurisprudence to reflect the fundamental
connectedness of women and reconstructs new legal concepts to take
into account the complicated realities of women's experience.
In "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory," Angela
Harris argues that feminists like West and MacKinnon describe the
essential core identity of women in terms reflective of white, middleclass women and ignore differences of race and class. Harris contends that women of color contribute to feminist theory by focusing
on the role played by differences and the necessity of creating commonality among women despite the differences. In "Feminist Jurisprudence; Grounding the Theories," Patricia Cain discusses the development of feminist thought and the way in which feminist
scholars have excluded the experiences of lesbians.
In Part Three the editors selected essays that focus on contemporary developments within the law, particularly the critical legal
studies movement (CLS). One of the methods used by critical scholars is deconstruction, a process of examining allegedly neutral universal concepts and principles to expose the power relations that lie
beneath them. In "Deconstructing Contract Law," Clare Dalton applies deconstruction to cohabitation contracts and demonstrates how
the legal concepts of consent, objective intent, and consideration rest
upon unstated notions about gender roles and sexuality that reinforce
male power and female powerlessness in the family law setting. In
"Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis," Frances
Olsen argues that women should not confine their discussions to
what can be presented through traditional legal doctrine and that
feminist legal scholars should reconstruct sexuality by calling for
"what we really want." In "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women's Movement," Elizabeth Schneider rejects critical legal theorists' contention that rights are opposed to
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politics. She emphasizes the interrelationship between rights and political struggle and argues that the language of rights has enabled
women to form coalitions and assert a collective identity.
In "Feminist Critical Theories" Deborah Rhode argues that
deconstruction has limitations. She concedes that deconstruction has
been useful in exposing the way that Western philosophy has excluded the feminine; however, she argues that feminist legal scholars
must not stop at critiquing and must take positive steps to transform
institutional and social practices.
The articles in Part Four engage in self-criticism. In "Feminist
Reason: Getting It and Losing It," Martha Minow argues that feminists perpetuate exclusions by failing to apply insights from their
own experience to forms of subordination based upon other factors
besides gender. She argues that feminists must look beyond gender
discrimination and challenge other discriminatory practices.
In "Feminist Legal Methods," Katharine T. Bartlett examines
empiricism, standpoint epistemology and postmodernism and argues
in favor of "positionality," an analysis that is based upon experience
as well as self-criticism. In "Subordination, Rhetorical Skills, and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.," Lucie White analyzes her role as lawyer in her representation- of a black welfare recipient at a welfare fraud hearing. She examines the historical, social, and bureaucratic barriers Mrs. G must face and her own
complicity, and by implication, the complicity of all lawyers in the
hierarchies and social barriers faced by the disadvantaged.
Feminist Legal Theory reflects the development of feminist legal
theory and the rich mosaic of feminist jurisprudence. The editors
have organized the articles thematically and have made careful selections that illustrate the ideological and philosophical breadth of the
movement. This book contains the work of the major feminist theoreticians in the field and should be required reading for anyone interested in feminist legal scholarship.

